Articulation of Effective Leadership Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Articulation of Effective Leadership - Essay Example The paper tells that the personality of individuals plays a great role in the leadership traits that the person holds. A person displays this behavioral and emotional character to the world. The ideas of an individual characterize the personality of the person. Leaders are majorly extroverts, as opposed to introverts who are better at sharing ideas than in interaction with people. Both personalities are useful for the realization of the strengths and weaknesses of a society that a person yearns to lead. The public picture drawn by a person determines the following he/she enjoys. Ethics in leadership stirs the society towards ethical development and effective coexistence. Leaders who have ethical leadership skills influence the operations of an organization or community. Ethics ensures that the public mentality is set to do the right things, not to exploit the setbacks of others. The ethics in a leader begins with responsible handling of crisis to owning up in situations that implicat e their performance in public office. The inclusion of the entire society and members of an organization in decision-making proves to be ethical for the leadership style portrayed by a leader. The ethical background of a good leader should not allow the negative behaviors or deeds of certain individuals to erode the trust of the society. For it to be practiced by the followers, the leader should cultivate the accountability culture. By being accountable, the leadership builds trust and encourages communication in the process of building the society. The ethics in leadership is important in bringing unity to a people as the regulations of ethics exempt nobody from meeting them.

GCC Economics and OPEC Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

GCC Economics and OPEC - Research Paper Example The common market agreement among the GCC countries took effect from 1 January 2008. The members of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is an association of developing countries, which include Venezuela, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Nigeria, Libya, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Ecuador, Angola and Algeria. OPEC was formed to help market oil and stabilize oil prices in the world. United Arab Emirates United Arab Emirates whose capital city is Abu Dhabi, Dubai covers an area of 82,880 Km2 and the land is predominantly desert with few pockets of agricultural areas. It is a member of OPEC. The country has an opened and highly developed economy, which is among the fastest growing in the world. The rate of inflation in United Arab Emirates is low and was 0.9 percent and 1.6 percent in 2010 and 2009 respectively. To boost trade, a free trade zone for manufacturing and distribution purposes. Presence of a deep-water port has also promoted international trade. The rate of interest charged by commercial banks was also lower at 6.2 percent and 5.9 percent in 2010 and 2009 respectively. Figure 1: GDP growth rate There was a sharp decline in the real GDP growth from 3.2 percent in 2008 to -3.2 in 2009. Sharp decline is attributed to the global financial turmoil. However, there was a strong growth in real GDP growth rate to 5.3 percent in 2010 due to recovering economy and increasing oil prices. OPEC Quotas in United Arab Emirates is 2.3 million barrels daily but its capacity is 2.8 million barrels daily. According to CIA (2011), United Arab Emirates’ reserves are estimated to be 97.8 billion barrels. Non- oil sectors include agriculture that produce dried fish, dates, watermelons, vegetables, eggs, poultry and dairy products (Department of State 2011). Non-oil sector covers tourism and international finance. United Arab Emirates produces cement, aluminum, fertilizers, boat building, commercial ship repair, textiles and handicrafts. Major trade pa rtners include Japan, India, China, United States, Germany, Iran, South Korea and Thailand Saudi Arabia Kingdom of Saudi Arabia whose capital is Riyadh also referred to as Saudi Arabia covers an area of 2,149,690 km2 with arid climate. It is a member of OPEC. It has a command economy, where government controls major economic activities and depends heavily on oil exports. The GDP of Saudi Arabia was $623 billion in 2010. Inflation rate is slightly lower at 5.4 percent and 5.1 percent in 2010 and 2009 respectively. The unemployment rate in Saudi Arabia was 10.8 percent, 10.5 percent and 9.8 percent in 2010, 2009 and 2008 respectively. High unemployment rates are among the highest rates in the gulf region. Commercial bank interest rates were 7.3 percent and 7.2 percent in 2010 and 2009 respectively. The country’s proven oil reserves are 262.6 billion barrels (Sfakianakis 2011). Saudi Arabia has the largest oil reserves with and is the world top oil exporter. Oil generates 75 per cent of the total budget revenues and comprises about 90 percent of total exports. Increase in oil prices caused by increasing demand has improved the economy of Saudi Arabia. The current quota for Saudi Arabia as set by OPEC is 9.4 million barrels daily. However, the country can produce up to 10.52 millions barrels daily. The non-oil sector real GDP growth r

The House of the Spirits

The House of the Spirits How is humour used to unravel the natures of the main characters and why is it used for the main theme of social injustice in Isabel Allendes The House of the Spirits and Ferdinand Oyonos Houseboy? Humour is defined as writings and other material created to make people laugh[1]. It has been used to grasp the attention of the readers, with its main purpose being to entertain. In both The House of the Spirits and Houseboy, humour has been used from the very beginnings of the novel to really acquire the concentration of the readers and keep them captivated.   Besides than adding vibrancy to the characters, humour might also serve to highlight key underlying themes in the literary work. The focus of this essay will be on how the writers have utilised humour to reveal the nature of the main characters, either by describing their characters actions in an amusing way or how their risibility provides indirect insights into how they perceive the world around them. It shall also address why writers incorporate this literary technique with main theme of social injustice in their works. In both the texts above, the writers have used humour from the very beginning whilst introducing their main characters; this usage engrosses the reader to develop interest in the character. The House of the Spirits begins with a dramatic opening in a church deliverance. Perhaps, why Allende chose to start the novel setting in a church could be to emphasize the importance of religion to the people of that particular region , but the bathos comes by an abrupt statement   by Clara: the voice of little Clara was heard in all its purity psst! Father Restrapo! If that story about hell is a lie, were all fucked, arent we The reader surely didnt expect to hear such a statement from a 10 year old girl. This shows us that Clara is very bold and forthright about her views as she is able to question what she is being taught in the church about hell. Many people simply believe everything they are taught through religion but certainly not Clara.  Ã‚   The language itself is very amusing besides the context. psst! the use of this onomatopoeia shows the disrespect for the Father as it undermines his status by   mocking him during a sermon. The highly inappropriate use of the word fucked in front of the public shocks everyone. This radical, carefree nature of hers is what brings about the humour in this piece thus it serves to be a very pertinent introduction to Clara and sets the platform for the reader to expect more unusual doings throughout the novel. Like Allende, Oyono introduces Toundi with humour. Toundi narrates of how he is proud to read and write and wants to copy the whites man custom of keeping a diary. This tells us that young Toundi is naive and filled with desire of learning a lot about the white men .The joy he gets by being literate tells us that this character is filled with promise in the future and determination. He is also revealed to be mischievous child as he had been making fun of father Gilbert but he is nonetheless the main character which undergoes metamorphosis over the course of the story. Thus humour has been successfully used to reveal the character traits, make them more colourful, interesting, lively and keep the reader engaged actively. Claras character in The House of the Spirits has been revealed further in the novel as the story progresses in various occasions, the humour usually comes out when she does something unusual and also to note is the fact that her strangeness was an attribute of her character: she is a telekinetic; is rarely attentive; she can predict futures, read dreams, and, lives a very introvert life but still she amalgamates the family together, and is extremely caring for others. The humorous bits of kinesthetic abilities, being rarely attentive (which itself is ironic as discussed later) are the key to understanding Claras character. When Esteban is shouting at Clara.Clara let him scream his head off and bang on the furniture until he was exhausted. Then inattentive as ever, she asked him if he knew how to wiggle his ears. Clara is being scolded by her husband and all she is concerned is whether he can wiggle his ears. This shows us Claras absent mindedness and care-free nature. It also serves to show us how Clara prohibits anyone from forcing her by offering resistance by being inattentive. She will never directly express her disgust but rather suppress it in a subtle manner. This shows us that her character is refined in the sense she does not have a strong body language or rebellious nature but still is very firm by not allowing herself to be oppressed even by her husband.. Again humour has been used to reveal her character trait. On the other hand, Toundi further reveals his character further when he first came to meet Father Gilbert. The Father would use to come to the village and toss little lumps of sugar like throwing corn to chicken. The use of little lumps of sugar, though is humorous, it also indicates how easily native Cameroonian people were converted to Christians in the hope of a better life, but later most of them would remain in poverty or be killed. Here humour has been juxtaposed with social injustice but to imply it in a more subtle way so as not to make the reader very sad with emotions. Toundi continues to describe how he too would fight for these lumps of sugar- and this tells us that Toundi is a boisterous kid who did not shy away from what he didnt like- but unlike Clara in The House of the Spirits ,he is willing to fight for it. It also reinforces the point made earlier about what allure white men especially Father Gilbert held for Toundi.

Egyptian Bedouins :: essays research papers fc

The Life of the Egyptian Bedouins   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The Bedouin people of Egypt can easily be described as a people with no place to call a home. Studying the Bedouins show that they have a deep and unique culture. They do not get involved in politics, and they live a humble and modest life. The Bedouin Nomads of Egypt are predominantly Muslim. Therefore, their beliefs, practices and rituals will be the same as that of a common Muslim. I will discuss the doings of Muslims but more importantly, I will concentrate on the beliefs and other aspects that make the Bedouin people unique and different from other Muslims.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  In Islam, there is something known as the five pillars. These five pillars detail how to carry on your religious duty. The five pillars of Islam start off with the belief in the oneness of God and Muhammad as his prophet, as well as belief in all other prophets before Muhammad. The next pillar is prayer. Prayer must be carried out five times a day. The first prayer called Fagr (streak of light) must take place between when the first light of the day is seen until 10:00 am. The second prayer called al-duhr (noon prayer) should be done between noon and the next prayer which is the asr (afternoon) prayer. The fourth prayer of the day is the Maghrib (sundown) prayer. The last prayer is called the Isha (night) prayer. If any prayer is missed at any time of the day for any reason, it can be made up at a later time. The next pillar of Islam is al-sowm (the fast). Muslims must fast during the Islamic month of Ramadan. Muslims engage in this practice in order to gain endur ance and compassion for the poor. The fourth pillar of Islam is zakah (charity), every Muslim is asked to give a fraction of their money to the poor. This fraction is usually a percentage of their wealth. The final pillar is the Hajj (journey to Mecca), a mature Muslim must visit Mecca in Saudi Arabia at least once in their life. A Muslim that visits Mecca seven times in their lifetime can visit the Dome of the Rock is Jerusalem. The Dome of the Rock is the second most holy place in the world for Muslims. Most reputable literature written on the Bedouins were written by anthropologists that have spent time and traveled with them.

Novel by Haruki Murakami Essay

The short story â€Å"On Seeing the 100% Perfect Girl One Beautiful April Morning† by Haruki Murakami connects with the reader through the idea that you can encounter true love by chance. Unfortunately, that chance can get away from you without any real action from yourself. The story is set in Tokyo in 1981 on what is described as a beautiful April morning. It sounds like a regular day, what made it beautiful for the main character was that he saw the girl that was 100% perfect girl for him. The methods of fiction help us better understand and connect to stories. The narration is done in the first and third person points of view. The first person point of view inserts the reader into the situation, making the story very personal. The third person narrative gives a different, larger perspective on the story and gives us more of an insight into the concept of chance. From a characterization stand point the main character is portrayed as a regular person and really only encounters a regular girl but in his eyes, she is really more like a girl from another world. There is one other person in the story but only provides a little bit of dialogue and is not developed at all. The third person narrative develops the two different main characters in ways first person does not. The overall tone of the story is somber. The idea of once having your true love so close then letting â€Å"fate† run its course only to never feel the same way again is depressing As a whole, this story connects the reader to an event that many have probably encountered in their life; seeing the perfect person, just for a second but not taking action. We go on with our lives and think nothing of it but this story delves a bit deeper into a possible scenario connecting the two people. In the end however, the characters still lose each other.

Clausewitz in the 21st Century

Clausewitz lived in a time where battles were fought in columns and lines, with soldiers using muskets and solid-shot cannon; when states were the exclusive actors in war; when technological change occurred over decades, if not centuries. What relevance could his work therefore have for the strategic problems of the 21st century? Introduction Clausewitz was not a cookbook writer. He was not looking for hard and fast rules for conducting war, which he eschews.Indeed, Clausewitzian theories elaborated at different periods of time are in close conjunction with the prevalent political, strategic, and military context, which is completely consonant with Clausewitz’s original conception of his own work: ‘Theory should be study, not doctrine [†¦] It is an analytical investigation leading to a close acquaintance with the subject; applied to experience – in our case, to military history – it leads to thorough familiarity with it.The closer it comes to that goal , the more it proceeds from the objective form of a science to a subjective form of a skill, the more effective it will prove in areas where the nature of the case admits no arbiter but talent. ’ ‘Theory is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield. ’ If ‘the absurd difference between theory and practice’ is to be ended, then the correspondence between theory and practice implies the correspondence between the military commander and military thinker.Therefore, ‘self-education’ is important and useful to the military thinker too. He must not be bounded by a single theory of war but with the means to develop his own ideas (objective knowledge of war), fuelled by his talent (subjective capacity and application). The phenomena of war are more diverse than ever: from terrorism to inter-state war, from information war to riots in rural are as, from air strikes to intifada. Loose networks of limited wars have replaced the expectation of a nuclear apocalypse that characterized the Cold War.The differences and contradictions between the various conclusions and corresponding analyses regarding a strategic situation are but a reflection of the variety of military conflicts and the diversity of perspectives from which these conflicts are observed. These perspectives depend on time, culture, and political context. This phenomenon has been analyzed through the concept of strategic culture, that is ‘a distinctive and lasting set of beliefs, values and habits regarding the threat and use of force, which have their roots in such fundamental influences as the geographical setting, history and political culture’.States (e. g. Americans, Europeans, Chinese, Iranians, Indians etc. ) tend to have different perspectives on strategic problems, and the reason for these divergences probably goes beyond the defense of short-t erm interests. The extremely heterogeneous situation of the phenomena of war is analyzed from very different lenses of different strategic cultures, and hence makes states’ theories of war difficult to critique. Moreover, it is difficult to validate the doctrines that reflect these different theories by the use of examples of operational success or failure.Therefore, the need for a theory-of-theories of war remains valid. An overarching theory of war will take into account the influence of the interaction between the thinker and his object and can form the framework required to analyze the strategic debate. Clausewitz thus continues to remain relevant to analyze strategic problems of the 21st century as he had developed a theory about the theory of war. Research ApproachClausewitz recognized that Napoleon had overreached himself and the theoretical significance that a consistent, single military strategy could have different historical outcomes. In his own realization  œ evident in his note of 1827 – that any theory of war had to accommodate two sorts of war: war to overthrow the enemy; and war that is the basis of negotiation with him. Four fundamental contrasts are emphasized between the early and later Clausewitz because they remain central to contemporary debates about his work: (1) The primacy of military force versus the primacy of politics. 2) Existential warfare, or rather warfare related to one’s own identity, which engaged Clausewitz most strongly in his early years, as against the instrumental view of war that prevails in his later work. (3) The pursuit of military success through unlimited violence embodying ‘the principle of destruction’, versus the primacy of limited war and the limitation of violence in war, which loomed increasingly large in Clausewitz’s later years. (4) The primacy of defense as the stronger form of war, versus the promise of decisive results that was embodied in the seizure of of fensive initiative.It is not the intent or purpose of this paper to summarize Clausewitz’s works, given its scope, or to challenge the assertions of specific anti-Clausewitz writers such as Martin van Crevald, John Keegan or even Alvin and Heidi Toffler. The paper will instead highlight the seeming unbounded-ness of war (or armed conflict) and violence in the twenty-first century, and propose a strategy of containment of war and violence. This will relate later Clausewitz’s concepts of war and politics to our current reality. At the outset, I will provide an analysis of Clausewitz’s concept of the nature of war.Additionally, given the research question’s implication that Clausewitz should be marooned due to his lack of regard for ‘non-state actors’ and that his writings were in a time of slow ‘technological change’, I will also demonstrate that Clausewitz was well-aware of the influence of non-state actors and their ability to wa ge war; and his thoughts has continued relevance in our time of rapid technological changes. The Nature of War For Clausewitz, war was likened to a chameleon, allowing for changes to its appearance, but suggesting that its underlying nature remains unchanged.The character of war has certainly changed or morphed since his time. His critics argue that some changes can alter war’s very nature, and the nature of war today is radically different from the nature of war then, the age of Napoleon. In other words, the changes are more fundamental than can simply be accounted by shifting characteristics. The most recent English translation of the text, by Michael Howard and Peter Parat, renders its opening sentence thus: ‘War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trinity. Clearly, a chameleon remains a chameleon whatever color it adopts for the time being . The crucial two words in the translation are ‘more than’, which imply that the circumstances of war can cause war to change more than its characteristics: War in other words is not like a chameleon. However, this translation did not capture the nuance of Clausewitz’s original: ‘Der Krieg ist also nicht nu rein wahres Chamaleon, weil er in jedem konkreten Fall seine Natur etwas andert, sondern er ist auch seinem Gesamterscheinungen nach, in Beziehung auf die in ihm herrschenden Tendenzen, eine wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit’.The implication here is that war may indeed be a chameleon, in that it changes its nature slightly in each individual case (its ‘character’), but not its nature in general, which is made up of the ‘trinity’ (addressed later). The translation thus reads: ‘War is not only a true chameleon, because it changes its nature slightly in each concrete case, but it also, in it is overall appearance, in relation to its inherent tendencies, a wondrous trinity’. The Primacy of Policy and the ‘Trinity’ War is an instrument of policy. ’ It ‘is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means’. Clausewtiz’s aphorism on the relationship between war and policy was now being dismissed not because war had no utility but because it is being waged for reasons that are not political or policy-driven. Critics argue that Clausewitz no longer have a place in the current strategic and security studies debates, where war was no longer the province of armed forces but also of non-state actors.The question was whether strategy, traditionally-defined, continues to be the best way of looking at what was, revealingly, no longer even called war, but armed conflict. Clausewitz understood a community as having its own political and social identity, even if it lacked statehood. Such an interpretation is consonant with Clausewitz’s own interest in wars before 1648, where he specifically linked the weaknesses of states to ‘exceptional manifestations in the art of war’.In his review of the history of war, he described ‘the semibarbarous Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords and trading cities of the Middle Ages, eighteenth-century kings and the rulers and peoples of the nineteenth-century’ as ‘all conducting war in their own particular way, using different methods and pursuing different aims’. Despite this variability, Clausewitz stresses that war is all these cases remains a continuation of their policy by other means. In doing so, however, he suppresses the difference between the policies of states and the intentions of other communities which wage war.Therefore, it makes sense to supplement the primacy of policy as a general category with the affiliation of belligerents to a warring community. If the communities are states, we can speak of politics in th e modern sense; if they are ethnic, religious, or other communities, the value systems and goals of those communities (their ‘cultures’) are the more important factors. Based on this, we could replace Clausewitz’s meaning of state with the notion of it being that of the intentions, aims or values of the â€Å"warring community,† thus remaining much more faithful to his understanding of what a state embodies.Otherwise, we would implicitly express a modern understanding of Clausewitz’s concept of state. Clausewitz’s concepts of war (including armed conflict) and violence continue to be relevant so long as they are motivated by interests and policy and not hate, rage, boredom, the need for personal meaning and bonding. Die Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit (The Wondrous Trinity) Clausewitz describes the trinity as composed of: (1) Primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are regarded as a blind natural force; (2) The play of chance and probabilit y, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and 3) Its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason. Read in tandem with Clausewitz’s metaphor of war’s appearance from case to case as a chameleon, the trinity addresses the underlying forces that drive those changes. His message was that the relationship among these three elements was inherently unstable and shifting. To quote, ‘the task†¦is to keep our theory [of war] floating among these three tendencies’, and not try to set, or to count on any fixed relationship among them. Clausewitz and a New ContainmentThe Removal of the Inhibitions on War and a New Containment The twenty-first century appeared for a time an age defined by economics and, to a great extent, peace. These expectations quickly disappeared with the massacres and genocides in Africa, return of war to Europe, the 9/11 attacks, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars with their continuing, vi olent consequences and the Arab Springs. A struggle against a new totalitarianism of an Islamic type appears to have started, in which war and violence is commonly perceived as having an unavoidable role, and perceived to be becoming more ‘unbounded’ than ever before.Spatially, the terrorist are potentially ever present. Temporally, there seems no end-in-sight to their attacks. We face new types of threats such as the development of atomic bombs by ‘problematic’ states like Iran and North Korea and the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. The emergence of China as a potential superpower and perhaps great powers, like India, may lead to a fresh arms dynamic, with the possibility of a nuclear dimension. Violence seems to be going out of rational control, an image that the media has not hesitated to portray.There is a grave portent of mankind confronting a ‘coming anarchy’ of unknown dimensions. Hence, a new strategy of contain ment is needed. There is no longer one exclusive actor to be contained. A strategy for military containment of China similar to that used against the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s, will likely provoke all kinds of crises and even conflict, which such a strategy intends to avoid. Therefore, a different concept of containment is needed, one that is not perceived as a threat by China.The second difference is that current developments in the strategic environment display fundamentally conflicting tendencies. A strategy designed to counter only one of these conflicting tendencies may be problematic with respect to the others. Therefore, there is a need to strike a balance between competing possibilities. The third difference is that the traditional containment was perceived mainly as military deterrence of the Soviet Union. The new containment must combine traditional, military containment on one side and a range of opportunities for cooperation on the other.That is necessary with respect not only to China, but even to political Islam, in order to reduce the appeal of militant Islamic movements to millions of Muslim youths. In response to this unbounded-ness on war and violence, a conception for their containment is needed to provide a sustained and continual limitation through the ‘fencing in and encircling of the same forces’. The guiding perspective is that of a peaceful, or rather a pacified, global society. This perspective cannot be equated with â€Å"peace† since in order to reach this goal, non-peaceful, violent and even military means must in some cases be employed.Clausewitz’s Concept of Politics The defeat of Napoleon was the turning point of Clausewitz’s theory, where he faced the problem of dealing with strategies of limited war within the same conceptual framework as those leading to total defeat of the enemy. He realized that there are very different and even contrasting kinds of war and strategy. The conflicti ng tendencies in war, especially between ‘limited’ and ‘unlimited’ war compelled Clausewitz to conclude that the unifying general principle was politics. However, which kind of politics could serve to contain war and violence in the twenty-first century?Clausewitz’s notions of limited warfare have their foundations in the last parts of book VIII. They find some reflection in book I, chapter 2: ‘Be that as it may, we must always consider that with the conclusion of peace the purpose of the war has been achieved'; and further on: ‘Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. ’ In book VIII, he stated: ‘In this way the belligerent is again driven to adopt a middle course.He would act on the principle of using no greater force, and setting himself no greater military aim, than woul d be sufficient for the achievement of his political purpose. To turn this principle into practice, he must renounce the need for absolute success in each given case. ‘ It is a natural step to evolve from his strategy of limited warfare to one of the limitations of war and violence as the overarching purpose of political action in the twenty-first century. This perspective is still based on Clausewitz's statement that war is a continuation of politics by other means, while trying to actualize his concept of politics.Clausewitz describes war on the one hand as a continuation of politics, but on the other side as waged with other than political means. This implicit tension is the basis of the explicit contrast between the first and the third tendencies of Clausewitz’s trinity. Furthermore, one could argue that globalization and the ubiquity of information technologies have created a worldwide political space from which no one can escape, however much his actions might be derived, in their immediate motivation, from private interests or from the cultural practices of ethnic or tribal communities.Hence, the role of politics is intensified and reaction time within all three tendencies of Clausewitz’s trinity is reduced. Containing War and Violence in World Society The concept of containment is associated with the insight that we cannot expect in the foreseeable future to see fully non-violent societies or a non-violent world society. In addition, the aspiration to a world without conflicts as such fails to recognize that in the course of history conflicts and conflict solutions have frequently been necessary for human development.The main task confronting politics and social forces in the twenty-first century is the radical limitation, even diminishing of violence and war, so that non-violent structures can be sustained and the mechanisms of the ‘world of societies' can come to fruition. The overall political perspective on which the conce pt of the containing of war and violence in world society rests therefore consists of the following elements, the ‘pentagon of containing war and violence': 1) The ability to deter and discourage any opponent from fighting a large-scale war and to conduct precise military action as a last resort; (2) The possibility of using military force in order to limit and contain particularly excessive, large-scale violence which has the potential to destroy societies; (3) The willingness to counter phenomena which help to cause violence, such as poverty and oppression, especially in the economic sphere, and also the recognition of a pluralism of cultures and styles of life in world society; 4) The motivation to develop a culture of civil conflict management (concepts which can be summed up in the ‘civilizational hexagon', global governance, and democratic peace), based on the observation that the reduction of our action to military means has proved counterproductive and in the end will exceed our military capabilities; and (5) Restricting the possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, as well as of small arms, because the proliferation of both is inherently destructive to social order. Antulio Echevarria writes that ‘the U. S.National Strategy for Combating Terrorism also includes an essential, but rather ambitious goal of diminishing the conditions that terrorists typically exploit, such as poverty, social and political disenfranchisement, and long-standing political, religious, and ethnic grievances; reducing these conditions requires, among other things, fostering political, social, and economic development, good governance, the rule of law, and consistent participation in the â€Å"war of ideas† Further important tasks include preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of small arms.Normative criteria are required for the containment of war and violence in world society. Such cri teria combine political–moral considerations with aspects relevant to every state's interest in self-preservation. It requires political actors to recognize the advantages of self-limitation as part of their own enlightened self-interest. In anthropological terms, we can see the roots of the political in the openness and indeterminacy of the human power to act. In historical terms, we can follow Aristotle in seeing these roots in the way we are forced to limit ourselves once we become aware of the contingency of human actions.It follows from this that one of the decisive questions for future development is that of the possible self-interest of the United States, or regional powers, making conflict subject to legal norms, in civil conflict management, and binding military power into alliance systems. President Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ necessitated the development of a military strategy for the potential, if highly improbable, conflict with China. Seeking a d ecisive victory or traditional military containment are not viable strategies in current and projected realities, as they probably only serve to escalate the situation.Also, the United States must select ways that minimize the probability of escalation to nuclear conflict simply because it does not understand China’s nuclear release process and there is no winner in a major nuclear exchange. The logic leads to the concept of Offshore Control. Operationally, it uses currently available means and restricted ways to deny China the use of the sea in a strategy of economic strangulation to exhaust China to the point it seeks war termination. Penetration into China is forbidden to reduce the possibility of escalation and to make war termination easier.Offshore Control seeks to allow the Chinese Communist Part to end the conflict in the same way China ended its conflicts with India, the UN (in Korea), the Soviet Union and the Vietnamese. It allows China to declare it â€Å"taught t he enemy a lesson† and thus end the conflict. The progressive limitation of war and violence indefinitely can be an end to itself in the realization of a basically peaceful global policy. The enduring and progressive containment of war and violence is therefore necessary for self-preservation of states, even their survival, and for the civility of individual societies and world society.Conclusion Clausewitz, in his note of 1827, recognized the need to rework the whole of On War according to his new insight, the distinction between limited war and war whose aim is to overthrow the enemy and render him powerless. However, he was not always clear in his thoughts especially in his early writings and even up to 1827. For example, there is a lack of clarity on the discourse at the beginning of book I, chapter 1, of the three interactions that push war to the extreme, despite the fact that these sections were presumably written after the note of 1827.It can be said that for the purpo se of analyzing and studying warfare, both the early and later Clausewitz is of great importance and value. However, for political and military action of our time, perhaps only the later Clausewitz needs serve as an important basis. As Clausewitz himself emphasized at the end of his discussion of the trinity, ‘at any rate, the preliminary concept of war casts a first ray of light on the basic structure of theory, and enables us to make an initial differentiation and identification of its major components. Thinking about contemporary and future warfare with, and sometimes beyond, Clausewitz can still be the best way to begin. Bibliography 1. Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Clausewitz and a New Containment. In S. Hew, ; H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 283-307). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 2. Andreas, H. -R. , ; Antulio , E. (2007, December 27). Clausewitz in the Twenty First-Century: Primacy of Policy and a New Containment. From World Secur ity Network: http://www. worldsecuritynetwork. com/showArticle3. cfm? article_id=14985 3. Antulio, E. (1995-1996, Winter).War, Politics and the RMA: The Legacy of Clausewitz. Joint Force Quarterly, pp. 76-80. 4. Antulio, E. I. (2003). Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War. The European Legacy, 8/3, pp. 317-32. 5. Clausewitz, C. v. (1976). On War. In H. Michael, P. Peter, H. Michael, ; P. Peter (Eds. ). New Jersey: Princeton. 6. Durieux, B. (2009). Clausewitz and the Two Temptations of Modern Strategic Thinking. In S. Hew, ; H. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 251- 265). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 7. Hammes, T. (2012, Spring). Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy. Infinity Journal, 2(2), pp. 0-14. 8. Hew, S. , ; Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Introduction. In S. Hew, ; H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 1-13). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 9. Antulio, E. (2009). Clausewitz and the Nature of the Wa r on Terror. In S. Hew, ; H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 196-218). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 10. Ken, B. , ; R. , T. (1999). Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region. London. 11. Metz, S. (1994). Clausewitz Homepage. From A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st-Century Warfare: http://www. lausewitz. com/readings/Metz. htm 12. Sumida, J. (2009). On Defence as the Stronger Form of War. In S. Hew, ; H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 164-181). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. ——————————————– [ 1 ]. Durieux, B. (2009). Clausewitz and the Two Temptations of Modern Strategic Thinking. In S. Hew, & H. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 251- 265). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. [ 2 ]. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Pet er Parat (Princeton, NJ, 1976), II, 2, p. 141. 3 ]. Ibid. II, 2, p. 141. [ 4 ]. Ibid. II, 2, p. 142. [ 5 ]. Ken, B. , & R. , T. (1999). Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region. London. [ 6 ]. Durieux, B. (2009). Clausewitz and the Two Temptations of Modern Strategic Thinking. In S. Hew, & H. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 251- 265). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. [ 7 ]. The same principles and strategies that were the decisive foundation of Napoleon’s initial successes at Jena and Auerstedt proved inadequate in the special situation of the Russian campaign and eventually contributed to his final defeat at Waterloo. 8 ]. Clausewitz or Sun Tzu – Paradigms of warfare for the 21st century written by: Andreas Herberg-Rothe, 13-Dec-06. WorldSecurityNetwork. com – WorldSecurityNetwork. com. http://www. worldsecuritynetwork. com/printArticle3. cfm? article_id=13757 [ 9 ]. On War, I, 1,  §28, P. 89. [ 10 ]. Hew, S. , & Andrea s, H. -R. (2009). Introduction. In S. Hew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 1-13). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. [ 11 ]. Vom Kriege, ed. Werner Hahlweg (19th edn, Bonn, 1980), 1, 1,  §28, pp. 212-213. 12 ]. On War, VIII, 6B, p. 610. [ 13 ]. Ibid. p. 605. The phrase ‘with the addition of other means’ is deliberately used by Howard and Paret as they wanted to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. Essentially, the intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continues throughout war into the subsequent peace. It could not be otherwise.Political relations between peoples and between their governments do not stop when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged. [ 14 ]. The German word Politik covers both policy and politics . Clausewitz did mean different things at different points. Sometimes the context suggests that he has foreign policy in mind, at others he highlights the social upheaval of the French Revolution and its consequence for warfare. [ 15 ]. Antulio Echevarria, ‘War, Politics and the RMA: The Legacy of Clausewitz’, Joint Force Quarterly, 10 (winter 1995-6), 76-80. [ 16 ]. On War, VIII, 3B, p. 589 [ 17 ]. Ibid. p. 586. 18 ]. Hew, S. , & Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Primacy of Policy and Trinity in Clausewitz’s Thought. In S. Hew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 74-90). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. No modern translator is prepared to render wunderliche in the military context as â€Å"wonderful† or â€Å"wonderous†. Howard and Paret in 1976 used ‘remarkable’, which was a throwaway word of no particular significance. This was changed to ‘paradoxical’ in the 1984 edition, but this word seem s to have no relationship to wunderliche and carries inappropriately negative connotations. 19 ]. On War, I, 1,  §28. [ 20 ]. Ibid. Clausewitz’s description of the trinity followed after the metaphor of war as a chameleon. [ 21 ]. Ibid. [ 22 ]. George Kennan formulated his original vision of containment more than sixty years ago. Although altered in its application by various administrations in the United States, it has in practice been incorporated within the concept and politics of common security, which in turn has itself been the essential complement to purely military containment. [ 23 ]. In comparison to the Cold War. [ 24 ].Between globalization on the one hand, and local struggles for identity and regional advantages and interests on the other; between high-tech wars and combat with ‘knives and machetes’ or attacks by suicide bombers between symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare; between wars over the ‘world order’, with the re-politicizatio n and re-ideologization, between imperial-hegemonic dominance of the only superpower and the formation of new regional power centers; between international organized crime and the institutionalization of regional and global communities; and between increasing violations of international law and human rights on one side and their expansion on the other. [ 25 ]. Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Clausewitz and a New Containment. In S. Hew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. , Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 283-307). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. [ 26 ]. Clausewitz discussed unlimited and limited war in terms that supported his conception of the defense as the stronger form of war. The central issue in both cases of war was the will of the combatants. Unlimited war occurred when the attacker was determined to destroy the political independence of the defender through battle if necessary, and the defender no less determined to preserve its political independence. Equivalence in the stre ngth of will did not, however, mean the outcome would be determined by the balance of military forces and the fortunes of war.Even catastrophic military defeat at the hands of a militarily superior attacker, Clausewitz believed, would not produce a decision if the defender had the will to preserve what remained of his regular military forces by retreat even to the point of abandonment of all national territory, and to resort to armed popular support against the invader in spite of its potential to promote anarchy. Limited war meant a situation in which the attacker's objectives did not involve the destruction of the political independence of the defender, and the defender's stake in the outcome was thus not one of survival. (Sumida, 2009) [ 27 ]. Andreas Herberg-Rothe had elaborated this interpretation in Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Das Ratsel Clausewitz. Politische Theorie des Krieges im WIderstreit (Munich, 2001), 79-145, and in the English edition of the same book, Clausewitz’s Puzzle (Oxford, 2007).We can find this conclusion in the trinity; within the note of 1827, in which Clausewitz mentioned both aspects as guiding principles for reworking the whole text; in book I, chapter 2; and in most parts of book VIII of On War, [ 28 ]. On War, I, 2, pp. 91-2. [ 29 ]. Ibid. VIII, 3B, p. 585. [ 30 ]. It can be demonstrated that, due to systematic reasons but also with the respect to historical experience, trying to suspend this tension for the sake of the primacy of one of the two sides always leads to a primacy of the military means, of warfare and violence; see Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London, 2002). [ 31 ]. Antulio, E. I. (2003). Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War. The European Legacy, 8/3, pp. 317-32. [ 32 ].Ernst Otto Czempiel, Weltpolitik im Umbruch. Die Pax Americana, der Terrorisinus und die Zukunft der interuationalen Bezh. ‘hungen (Munchen, 2002). [ 33 ]. Andreas, H. -R. (2009). Clausewitz and a New Containment. In S. H ew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 283-307). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. [ 34 ]. Antulio, E. (2009). Clausewitz and the Nature of the War on Terror. In S. Hew, & H. -R. Andreas (Eds. ), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (pp. 196-218). New York: Oxford University Press Inc. [ 35 ]. Hammes, T. (2012, Spring). Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy. Infinity Journal, 2(2), pp. 10-14. [ 36 ]. Ibid. I, 1,  §28, p. 89.

Kerosene in Diesel Engine Question

Kerosene in Diesel Engine Question Scott, you are right, we had discussed the clear liquid shortening and I thought I had stayed away from it until I saw the cubies. Yesterday, I went back to my supplier and commented about the mixing of Clear Liquid Oil and Clear Liquid Shortening. Undoubtedly, the grill cook was not aware the oil had been mixed until I saw it on the cubies and so Ive been told they have a new supplier and it will be only Clear Liquid Oil. I have asked them to keep the empty cubies for me, so I can use them for storage, etc. I will wait and see what happens. The kero I had mentioned mixing with my biodiesel is considered highway kero with taxes paid on it at the pump. In N.C. all of our kero is dyed, as well as off road diesel. Our DOT will spot check big rigs, but so far I havent heard of them checking small diesels. However, I never use dyed fuel in my pickup. Next door in S.C. all of the fuel is cheaper due to our state taxes being lower so the kero is actually cheaper than their diesel. Our kero is higher than our diesel and the diesel is 20 to 40 cents higher per gallon than our unleaded. Several years ago, I had an Olds with a GM diesel (converted gasoline to diesel) and the book allowed me to use 10 percent gasoline during the winter to keep the diesel from gelling. Do you think that would be wise to use gasoline in biodiesel during the winter? My friend that I was splitting the oil with has backed out of using SVO I think mainly due to the mods he would have to do to his truck. Anyway, he left me with some literature he had pulled off the internet about using SVO and unleaded gasoline. Im thinking that would be a great way to blow an engine or at least coke it pretty heavily in a short time. Looks like there is a little of everything on the net. Have a great day. Tom Hey Tom,As long as you can get highway kero, and its cheaper, go ahead and run it with a mixture of at least B20 to keep the lubricity up. Kerosene is often used as a thinning (viscosity reducing) agent to help prevent diesel (middle distillate grade #2) and biodiesel fuel gelling in cold weather, but it does reduce the fuels lubricity as well. Since biodiesel has a very high level of lubricity, the reduction from mixing with kerosene is minimal. With regular petro diesel, care must be taken to avoid over-thinning. To avoid this problem, most fuel distribution centers carry winter diesel (light distillate grade #1) for delivery to fueling stations in cold climates. Diesel engines, however, are remarkably tolerant of fuel formulations and can run on just about any low volatility oil based fuel, but of course that doesnt mean they should or that it is even legal (tax wise) or beneficial to do so. While the engines themselves (pistons and valves) are more or less indifferent to fuel types, the emissions and injection controls on modern clean diesel engines would likely be damaged by using any fuel other than ULSD or B5. For illustration purposes only, following is a (mostly complete) list of fuels that can be burned in a diesel engine: Diesel #1 Diesel #2 Diesel #4 ULSD (Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel) Biodiesel (from B5 to B100) Kerosene Home heating oil Civil jet fuel (Jet A-1, Jet A, Jet B) Military jet fuel(JP-4,JP-5,JP-8) SVO (Straight Vegetable And this is interesting- your fuel prices in the Carolinas are different than ours further north. In central PA as of 05-20-08: No, the E85 price is not a typo. Ethanol based fuel has been about a buck a gallon cheaper for the last several years. Ive been experimenting with varying percentages of E85 in my gasoline powered 5.7-liter 1994 Chevy Silverado. A story about my results as well as doing a full conversion to E85 is in the plans. Which brings me to your question about running a gasoline and SVO (straight vegetable oil) mixture in a diesel. I would steer clear for the very reasons you mentioned as well as others from horror stories Ive heard. Diesels are compression ignition engines designed for dense, low volatility oil based fuels (diesel, biodiesel and kerosene). Gasoline style engines are spark ignited and require light and highly volatile fuels (gasoline, alcohol and E85). It doesnt take a stretch of the imagination to understand that an improperly-mixed amount of gasoline and vegetable oil (too much gasoline) could easily prematurely ignite (detonate) and destroy a diesel engines pistons and/or va lvetrain. Reciprocally, Ive heard stories of mixtures with too much veggie oil gumming up and clogging filters, pumps and injectors. In my opinion, there are only two safe methods to run vegetable oil in a diesel engine: Use properly manufactured biodiesel, or install a conversion kit that heats (thus reducing viscosity) the SVO before introduction to the fuel pump and injectors. As always, Tom, thanks for the great comments and questions. Best,Scott